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C H A PT E R J 
Conflict 9fLaws 
FltANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J. 
, J 
'§3.1.Fraui:tlilent misrepresen:tation occUrring in Massachusetts: 
Determine"- by MaSsachlisetts law. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the ,First Circuit had occasion to apply Massachusetts choice-
of-law rules in the case 'ofDoo'dy v.1ohn Sexton & Co.1 The plaintiff 
Doody broughdt diversity action against the defendant corporation 
in the United' 'States; .Di~trict Co'Urt for the. District of Massachusetts. 
The de£endcint,amerchandising company having head offices in Chi-
cagoand doipg business in a number of states, had employed the 
plairitiff in. id; Bostoh . df.lice. At a conference in Chicago two of the 
defendant's officers' promised the plaintiff lifetime employment in the 
company's Los Angeles office if he would move to California. The 
plaintiff di4,move, but he found substantially different working con-
ditions than' he had been promised. When the plaintiff complained 
to one of the defendant's officers on the strength of his Chicago prom-
ise, the officer averred that he had been "kidding" and that Doody 
would have to accept the situation or quit. The plaintiff quit his job 
and returned to Boston. 
The plaintiffs suit for damages for his out-of-pocket loss as a result 
of this venture incorporated counts in both breach of contract and 
fraudulent misrepresentation. The federal district court directed a 
verdict for the defendant on the breach of contract count, but allowed 
the case to be submitted to the jury on the fraudulent misrepresen-
tation issue. The court entered judgment on the jury's verdict for 
the plaintiff. The court of appeals, in the present case, affirmed the 
judgment of the district court, holding that under Massachusetts law 
the defendant company could be held liable for the representations 
made by its officers. 
The conflict of laws question presented by the appeal was one of 
which law should govern the inquiry into whether the officers' promise 
of lifetime employment, with no intent to perform, was actjonable. 
This question was of crucial significance because a misrepresentation 
of a present intention, actionable in Massachusetts,2 is not actionable 
in Illinois.s Since jurisdiction in this case was based on diversity of 
FRANCIS J. NICHOLSON, S.J., is an Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law 
School and a member of the District of Columbia and Massachusetts Bars. 
§3.1. 1411 F.2d 1119 (1st Cir. 1969). 
2 Barrett Associates, Inc. v. Aronson, 346 Mass. 150, 190 N.E.2d 867 (19611). 
3 Illinois is one of the minority of jurisdictions which do not permit recovery in 
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§3.1 CONFLICT OF LAWS 61 
citizenship, the court of appeals noted initially that Klaxon Co. v; 
Stentor Electric Manufacturing CoJ required it to apply the conflict 
of laws rules that would be applied by the courts of Massachusetts; 
the forum state. Therefore, Massachusetts conflicts law governed the 
choice-of-Iaw issue. 
Under Massachusetts conflicts law the doctrine of lex loci delicti 
governs tort actions. Ii In applying the lex loci doctrine, Massachusetts 
follows the rule of the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws that 
"the place of the wrong is the state where the last event necessary to 
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place:'6 Since reliance 
was necessary for the imposition of liability for misrepresentation,' 
the tort was completed in Massachusetts, where the plaintiff gave up 
his Massachusetts employment and suffered his original loss. The 
court concluded, therefore, that the law of Massachusetts, not that of 
Illinois, was controlling on the issue of actionable misrepresentation~ 
The remaining question considered by the court of appeals was 
whether the defendant company could be held liable for the conse-
quences of the officers' wrongful act. Under Massachusetts law a 
principal can be held liable for misrepresentation based upon the 
unauthorized acts of an agent not too far removed from the scope 
of his authority.8 In the present case the defendant's officers . were its 
president and vice-president, both of whom clearly possessed certain 
hiring powers. The court held that it could be found that the plain-
tiff had a right to rely on the officers' representations, even though 
their actual authority did not extend to the point they had indicated~ 
The Massachusetts conflicts rule applied in the present case under 
the Klaxon mandate represents traditional choice-of-law doctrine in 
fraud and deceit cases. The standard approach, following the "last 
event" principle, states that the controlling law is that of the place 
where the injury first occurs.9 Where both the defendant's misrep-
resentation and the plaintiff's reliance and loss happen ,in the same 
state, the law of that state rather obviously governs matters of sub-
stance.10 It is only when the misrepresentation occurs in one state 
and the reliance and loss result in a second state that problems arise 
with the use of the place-of-impact test to determine governing law. 
In Doody, the false statements of the defendant's officers were made 
in Illinois. The plaintiff's reliance certainly took place in Massachu-
tort for promissory statements even if, when made, there was no intention to 
perform. See Repsold v. New York Life Ins. Co., 216 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1954); 
Brodsky v. Frank, 1I42 Ill. no, 1711 N.E. 775 (19l10). .. . 
4l111l u.s. 487 (1941). See also Sampson v. Channell, no F.2d 754? (1st Cir. 1940). 
Ii Trudel v. Gagne, 1I28 Mass. 464, 104 N.E.2d 489 (1952); Reed !Ie Barton Corp. v. 
Maas, 711 F.2d lI59 (1st Cir. 19l14). 
6 Restatement of Conflict of Laws §lI77; Strogoff v. Motor Sales Co., lI02 Mass. 
M5, 18 N.E.2d 1016 (19l19). 
7 Brockton Olympia Realty Co. v. Lee, 266 Mass. 550, 165 N.E. 8711 (1929). 
8 Robichaud v. Athol Credit Union, 1I52 Mass. 1I51, 225 N.E.2d 1I47 (1967). 
9 See R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law lI1I9 (1968). 
10See Bradbury v. Central Vermont Ry., Inc., 299 Mass. 211O, 12 N.E.2d 7112 (19118). 
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setts, bUt reliance also occurred in California when Doody moved to 
Los Angeles, relying on the Illinois promises. If the major part of 
the plaintiff's course of action in reliance had happened in Massachu-
setts, Massachusetts would have had a more important contact with 
the occurrence than did California; but, in view of the fact that re-
liance detrimental to the plaintiff also transpired in California, that 
state's connection with the cause of action should be considered.l1 
Prescinding from problems of the determination of the place of 
reliance, the plaintiff's domicile is a contact of substantial signifi-
cance when the loss is pecuniary in its nature. This is so because a 
finandal loss will usually be of greatest concern to the state with 
which the person suffering the loss has the closest ties. Although the 
court's opinion in Doody does not indicate the plaintiff's domicile, 
in all probability plaintiff was a Massachusetts domiciliary and, if 
such were the case, the ·1aw of Massachusetts would have been the 
proper law to apply. Nevertheless, the question of domicile should 
have been raised.12 
Massachusetts still retains the lex loci delicti doctrine as its choice· 
of-law rule in tort conflicts cases, although an increasing number of 
states have abandoned it. It is submitted that the automatic use of 
this rule, without recourse to considerations of other possible sub-
stantial contacts, is particularly undesirable with respect to the tort 
of fraudulent misrepresentation, where, as in Doody, the misrepre-
sentation and plaintiff's reliance often occur in a number of different 
jurisdictions. 
§3.2. Wrongful death action: Law of state with most significant 
relationship governs damages. In the recent decision of Tieman v. 
Westext Transport, Inc.,1 the United States District Court for the 
District of Rhode Island held that the Rhode Island death act, and 
not the Massachusetts statute, would be controlling in a wrongful 
death action, notwithstanding the fact that the fatal accident had 
occurred in Massachusetts. 
In April, 1964, James Tiernan, a domiciliary of Rhode Island, 
was seriously injured in a highway accident in Massachusetts. Tiernan 
was riding in the automobile of one Dunn, a domiciliary of New 
York, who was acting in the course of his employment for Supervised 
Investors Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation. The Dunn car was 
struck. by a tractor-trailer owned and operated by Westext, a Texas 
corporation, and driven by its employee West, a domiciliary of Ver-
mont. Shortly after the acxident, Tiernan died in Rhode Island as 
a result of his injuries; when the collision occurred, Tiernan was 
returning to Rhode Island, having left that state earlier in the day. 
11 R.estatement of Conflict of Laws Second § 148 (Proposed Official Draft Pt. 2, 
1968). 
12 Ibid. 
AU. 1295 F. Supp. 1256 (D.R..I. 1969). 
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The plaintiff administrator of the decedent Tiernan brought two 
diversity suits in the United States District Court for the District of 
Rhode Island. Westext, Supervised, and West were the defendants 
in the first suit. Dunn's wife, as administratrix of his estate, was the 
defendant in the second suit. In both cases the plaintiff stated causes 
of action under both the Rhode Island and Massachusetts wrongful 
death statutes. The plaintiff was a Rhode Island domiciliary, as were 
the decedent Tieman's wife and family. The defendant adminis-
tratrix was a domiciliary of Massachusetts but, at the time of the 
accident, had been domiciled in New York, where she was appointed 
administratrix and where Dunn's estate was being probated.1 
The defendants moved for dismissal as to the Rhode Island wrong-
ful death claims. The Rhode Island wrongful death statute places 
no limit on recovery, and is compensatory in that it focuses on the 
pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries.s The Massachusetts statute pro-
vides for a maximum recovery of $50,000, and measures damages by 
the standard of the degree of the defendant's culpability .• The de-
fendants argued that the Rhode Island wrongful .. death act could not 
be the basis for the plaintiff's claims because Rhode Island conHict of 
laws principles required the application of the substantive law of the 
place of the wrong, here Massachusetts. The plaintiff opposed the mo-
tions on the basis that the Rhode Island Supreme Court, if given the 
opportunity, would apply more modem conflicts rules by which Rhode 
Island law would control. After the parties had rejected the sugges-
tion of the federal district court that they obtain an authoritative 
determination of Rhode Island conHicts law in the state courts, the 
federal court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss in July, 
1965. The cases, however, continued in litigation because of the vi-
tality of the Massachusetta wrongful death causes of action. In the 
interim, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in Woodward v. Stewart,1> 
discarded the lex loci delicti rule in the area of multi-state torts, adopt-
ing the grouping of contacts and interest analysis principles. 
On the basis of the Woodward decision, the plaintiff moved to 
vacate the July, 1965 orders of dismissal. The plaintiff argued that 
the dismissals were not final, and that the Woodward criteria required 
the application of Rhode Island's wrongful death law. The defen-
dants responded by asserting that the previous dismissals were final 
1I Because the accident had occurred in Massachusetts, and because the decedent's 
estate was being probated in New York, the plaintiff commenced identical actions 
against the same defendants in the federal courts of Massachusetts and New York 
one month after the commencement of these suits in Rhode Island. The New York 
murt transferred its case to Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts court thereupon 
transferred both cues to Rhode Island. Consolidation of all these cases was sought 
and granted. See Tiernan v. Westext Transport, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1251 (D.R.I. 
1969). 
S R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§1G-7·1, 10·7·2 (1956) • 
• G.L., Co 229, §2. 
II-Ill.~, 245 A.2d 917 (1968). 
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judgments which could not be vacated at the trial level, and that the 
Rhode Island wrongful death statute was· not the governing law under 
Woodward's standards. 
The federal district court first considered the procedural aspects 
of the plaintiff's motion to vacate. The court pointed out that the 
question of the finality of decisions of the federal district courts was 
measured by Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
That procedural rule requires an express determination by the dis-
trict c<;mrt that there is no just reason for delay and an express di-
rection for the entry of judgment as ,the, two-fold sine qua non for a 
final determination. Because both of these requirements were lacking 
in each of the present cases, the dismissals of July, 1965 were not'final 
judgments and could be reconsidered by the court. 
The court found there was a furtherteason why it Was obligated 
to reconsider the previous orders of dismissal. That reasoBrested 
upon principles of federalism elaborated in decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court. In Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,e the 
Supreme Court held that the federal courts should modify their orders 
to conform to changes in state law during the: pendency of the case 
on appeaJ.7 A fortiori, the court reasoned, a change in state law during 
the pendency of the case at the trial level merited a similar modifi-
cation. Thus, the district court in Tiernan held that the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court's change from the lex loci delicti. doctrine to the "sig-
nificant contacts" rule in Woodward required the court to vacate 
the previous orders . of dismissal. 
The court then considered the conflict of laws question, specif-
ically whether the conflicts principles enunciated in Woodward war-
ranted the application of Rhode Island law. In terms of the factual 
contacts with the whole transaction, the· interest of Rhode Island 
clearly predominated over that of Massachusetts. 
The court next considered the respective interests of Rhode Island 
and Massachusetts with respect to the central iS$ue of compensation 
of the decedent's survivors. The interests of Massachusetts were lim-
ited. Massachusetts' only genuinely relevant contact was that the 
accident occurred there. Given that contact alone, the governmenta,l 
interest of Massachusetts would not be furthered by the application 
of Massachusetts law. There was no Massachusetts defendant to be 
protected by the statute's recovery limitation, and it could not be 
supposed that deterrence of recklessness on tile ,Massachusetts high-
ways would result from the imposition of a statutory $50,000 ceiling in 
a case in which over $45(},OOO was sought. On the other hand, Rhode 
Island's governmental interest was obvious. The plaintiff was the 
Rhode Island administrator of a. Rhodetslandcitizen's estate seeking 
benefits fora Rhode Island. wife and family. Rhode Island's interest 
in compensation as both parens patriae and family supporter would 
e Sl1 u.s. 5S8 (1941). 
'1 See also Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, SOS F.2d 125(lst Cir. 1962). 
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be advanced by the use of Rhode Island law. Therefore, the court, 
holding that the Rhode Island wrongful death statute was controlling, 
granted the plaintiff's motion to vacate the previous dismissal orders. 
The decision in Tiernan restates the significant relationship or 
interest-weighing approachs now firmly established in Rhode Island 
tort conflicts law by the Woodward case. This flexible approach, it 
is submitted, has properly safeguarded the forum state's interest in 
the question of damages in this litigation. The strict application of 
the lex loci delicti doctrine in this case would have produced a harsh 
result, for Massachusetts was not vitally concerned with the manner 
in which the Rhode Island wife and family of a Rhode Island dece-
dent were to be compensated for the wrongful death of their "bread 
winner." 
The somewhat unique fact pattern of this case prompts the fur-
ther observation that the application of the "contacts" or interest-
weighing approach need not be restricted to simple cases. The decision 
in Tiernan, with its complicated fact situation, indicates that this 
new technique makes it reasonably easy for bench and bar to calculate 
the equitable resolution of more difficult choice-of-Iaw cases. Indeed, 
it may in fact be that the efficacy of the interest-weighing approach 
to choice-of-Iaws problems is enhanced in cases where a complicated 
fact situation provides a greater number of contacts for the court 
to weigh in resolving which jurisdiction's law should govern its de-
cision. 
§3.3. Federal Tort Claims Act suit: Liability law of Massachu-
setts governs where alleged negligence occurred in Massachusetts 
resulting in Rhode Island death. In Bannon v. United States,l the 
plaintiff administratrix of the estate of Bannon brought a suit against 
the United States and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs, in the 
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act.2 The decedent Bannon was a veteran 
with a history of mental illness. At the time of his death he was under 
the supervision and care of a VA hospital in Massachusetts. At the 
hospital, Bannon was on so-called full privileges status with respect 
to his freedom of movement. In essence this meant he had full access 
to the ground facilities. Bannon eloped from the hospital, went into 
Rhode Island, and there took his own life. The plaintiff, alleging 
negligent conduct on the part of the defendant's agents, servants, and 
employees in failing to maintain proper hospital surveillance, sought 
damages for Bannon's death. The defendant government argued that 
the hosp~tal had given the decedent the care which his. condition 
required. After weighing all the evidence, the federal district court 
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. 
S See R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law 241$-265 (1968); Restatement of Conflict 
of Laws Second §§146, 175 (Proposed Official Draft Pt. 2, 1968). 
§U. 1291$ F. Supp. 1050 (D.R.I. 1968). 
228 U.S.C. §1S46(b) (1964). 
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The federal district court was presented with the problem. of de-
termining the applicable law of liability and damages where the 
allegedly negligent act of permitting the deceased to elope had oc-
curred in Massachusetts, while the death claimed to have resulted 
therefrom had occurred in Rhode Island. Since the suit was being 
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the choice-of-Iaw pro-
vision of that statute controlled. The statute's choice-of-Iaw rule states 
that the federal government should be liable in tort "where the United 
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accor-
dance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."a 
The accepted interpretation of the words "the place where the act 
or omission occurred" has traditionally been that the reference is 
to the place where the negligent acts happened, not to the place where 
the harmful impact occurred.4 Thus, the Federal Tort Claims Act 
does not follow the standard lex loci delicti principle of tort conflicts 
law. The law of Massachusetts, therefore, governed the question of 
liability and damages. 
Since the plaintiff's suit was for damages for Bannon's death, the 
district court ruled that the Massachusetts wrongful death statuteli 
applied. The statute sets a limit of $50,000 as maximum recovery, 
and this limitation would have been applicable ,to any judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff administratrix. 
The court then proceeded to analyze the apposite Massachusetts 
negligence law. It noted that there was a paucity of cases in Massa-
chusetts concerning the measure of care imposed on a hospital in 
caring for its patients, and particularly with respect to the duty of 
mental hospitals. On the basis of germane decisions of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court,s however, it was clear that the hos-
pital's duty of reasonable care imposed by Massachusetts law was 
limited by the rule of foreseeability. Considering all the evidence, 
the court found it could conclude it to have been foreseeable that 
the decedent :might act irrationally or elope from the hospital. Never-
theless, the evidence did not warrant the inference that the hospital, 
in the exercise of its duty of reasonable care, should have anticipated 
Bannon's self-destruction. As the plaintiff administratrix had not 
made out a case in negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, 
her complaint was dismissed. 
The choice-of-Iaw rule of the Federal Tort Claims Act, in its de-
parture from the traditional place-of-impact doctrine, is clearly inept.' 
Judge Goodrich once attempted to discover why the rule was written 
in this strange way, but he found only that the draftsmen of the stat-
8 Ibid. 
4 Richards v. United States, 569 u.s. 1 (1962). 
Ii G.L., c. 229, §2. 
41 Ellingsgard v. Silver, 1152 Mus. 54, 225 N.E;2d 8UI (1967); Fergueon v. Dr. Mc-
Carty'. Rest Home, Inc., 555 Mus. 755, 142 N.E~ 557 (1957). 
'See R. LeBar, American Conflicts Law 227 (1968). 
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ute thought that reference to the place of the negligent act or omis-
sion was the standard rule.s The United States Supreme Court was 
finally able, in Richards v. United States,9 to suggest a remedy for 
the abnormality which the statute had created. 
In Richards, the action was for negligence in Oklahoma, causing 
in Missouri an airplane crash which killed the plaintiff's decedent. 
Missouri law limited recovery to a $15,000 maximum while Okla-
homa law set no limitation on the amount of damages which could 
be recovered. The Supreme Court, using a renvoi approach, held 
that the reference to the law of "the place where the act or omission 
occurred" (Oklahoma) was a reference to the whole law of that state, 
including its conflicts law. The Oklahoma choice-of-Iaw rule was that 
the law of the place of the injury controlled. The reference to the whole 
law of Oklahoma was thus a reference to Missouri law, and the case 
was decided in an orthodox torts fashion. If the choice-of-Iaw rule 
in Oklahoma had been the modem "significant contact" principle, 
it too would have been followed. The Federal Tort Claims Act, as 
interpreted in the Richards case, permits growth in conflicts law, if 
the state "where the act or omission occurred" desires its conflicts 
law to develop. The unfortunate error in drafting the Federal Tort 
Claims Act has been remedied. 
In Bannon, the federal district court did not consider using a renvoi 
approach in applying the Massachusetts wrongful death statute as 
the law of "the place where the act or omission occurred." If the 
court had viewed the reference in the choice-of-Iaw rule of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act as a reference to the whole law of Massachu-
setts, including its conflicts law, the case would have been decided 
differently on the issue of the law governing liability and damages. 
The Massachusetts conflicts rule with respect to wrongful death ac-
tions is that the substantive rights of the parties are governed by the 
law of the place where the wrong was done.10 The lex loci delicti rule 
also determines the theory upon which damages are assessed.ll A 
reference to the whole law of Massachusetts, then, would have been 
a reference to the Rhode Island wrongful death act. 
A reading of the facts in Bannon seems to indicate that Rhode 
Island had the greater concern for the welfare of the decedent and 
his administratrix, and the liability law of Rhode Island should there-
fore have been applied by the court. The Richards interpretation 
of the Federal Tort Claims Act would have made this application 
possible. 
§3.4. Guest-host action: Law of state with most significant rela-
tionship applies to action for death of guest. As a result of incon-
S See Goodrich, Yielding Place to New: Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict of 
Laws, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 881, 894-895 (1950). 
11 569 u.s. I (1962). 
10 Trudel v. Gagne, 528 Mass. 464, 104 N.E.2d 489 (1952). 
11 Jackson v. Anthony, 282 Mass. 540, 185 N.E. 589 (1955). 
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sistencies.in several recently decided cases, the New York 'Court of 
Appeals has attempted in Tooker v. Lopez1 to give more precision 
to New York. choice-of-law rules for guest-host actions. The defen-
dant in Tooker, a New York domiciliary, was the owner of a New 
York registered and insured automobile which was used by his 
daughter, a student at Michigan State University. The defendant's 
daughter, while driving the car from the university to Detroit, was 
killed when the car overturned. The accident also took the life of 
her passenger, a classmate at the university and the daughter of the 
plaintiff. Both girls were New York domiciliaries. The plaintiff, father 
of the decedent passenger, brought an action for wrongful death as 
the administrator of her estate. The defendant asserted as an affir-
mative defense the Michigan "guest statute,"2 which permits recovery 
by guests only upon a showing of grass negligence on the part of the 
driver. The plaintiff moved to dismiss this defense on the ground 
that under the governing choice-of-law rules it was New York law 
rather than Michigan law which applied. The New York Supreme 
Court, Special Term, granted the motion 'to dismiss. The New York 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed, and appeal was taken. 
The court of appeals held that the law of New York rather than the 
Michigan "guest statute" was applicable to the action, and thus re-
versed the order of the appellate division. 
The court of appeals was presented with a choice-of-law problem 
which it has had occasion to consider in several cases since its decision 
in Babcock v. Jackson,8 in which the court rejected the traditional 
rule of lex loci delicti in tort cases. The court had recently acknowl-
edged that its decisions in multi-state highway accident cases, sub-
sequent to the rejection of the lex loci delicti rule, "have lacked a 
precise consistency.'" Guest-host suits had proved to be a class of 
cases which had been particularly troublesome. Tooker gave the court 
the opportunity to lay down more exact guidelines for the 'solution 
of guest-host conflicts problems. 
In Babcock, the plaintiff, while on a weekend trip with her neigh-
bors to Ontario, Canada, was injured when an automobile in which 
she was a passenger crashed into a stone wall. Both plain~ff and her 
neighbors, who owned and operated the vehicle, were New York 
domiciliaries, and the car was registered and insured in that state. 
Upon her return to New York the plaintiff commenced an action 
to recover for her personal injuries. The Ontario "guest statute," 
which prohibits suit by guests against negligent hosts, was asserted 
as a defense. The court of appeals rejected unequivocally the tradi-
tional lex loci delicti rules and refused to apply Ontario law. The 
§5.4. 124 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 594, 50l N.Y.s.2d 519 (1969). 
2 Mich. Stat. Ann. §9.2101 (1968). 
812 N.Y.2d 475,191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.s.2d 745 (1965). 
'Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 16, 257 N.E.2d 877. 879. 290 N.Y.S.2d 754. 787 
(1968). noted in 1968 Ann. Surv. MIUI. Law §4.1. 
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court adopted the "significant contacts" doctrine, which emphasizes 
the need for analyzing and measuring the relevant interests of the 
states involved as to the particular issue presented in order to deter-
mine which decisional rule is to govern. The specific issue in Bab-
cock· was whether the plaintiff was barred from recovering damages 
because she was a guest. As to that issue the court concluded that 
it was New York which had the only interest: 
New York's policy of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate 
his guest for injuries caused by his negligence cannot be doubted 
... and our courts have neither reason nor warrant for depart-
ing from that policy simply because the accident, solely affecting 
New York residents and arising out of the operation of a New 
York based automobile, happened beyond its borders. Ii 
Babcock was followed by Dym v. Gordon.6 The plaintiff and the 
defendant in that case were New York domiciliaries taking summer 
courses at the University of Colorado. The plaintiff, while a passen-
ger in a car driven by the defendant, was injured during a short trip 
in Colorado when the automobile collided with a vehicle owned 
and operated by a resident of Kansas. Upon her return to New York, 
the plaintiff commenced an action to recover for her personal in-
juries. The defendant asserted a "guest statute" defense based on 
Colorado law, which statute barred a guest's recovery against his 
host unless there was a showing of gross negligence. The issue in 
Dym, quite simply, was whether the rationale of Babcock required 
the application of the law of New York or Colorado. A closely di-
vided court concluded that the purpose of the Colorado "guest stat-
ute" was to grant injured parties in other cars priority over the 
"ungrateful guest" in the assets of the negligent driver. Since Dym 
involved another vehicle, and since third parties were injured, the 
court ruled that Colorado, unlike Ontario in Babcock, had an in-
terest in the application of its law. Therefore, Colorado law governed. 
In Tooker, the appellate division felt constrained by the holding 
in Dym to apply the Michigan "guest statute." The court of appeals, 
in reversing the appellate division, held that the decision in Dym was 
clearly distinguishable on the· basis of the different facts in the two 
cases. There was in Tooker no third-party "non-guest" who was injured, 
and there was therefore no question of denying such a party priority in 
the assets of the negligent defendant. On the contrary, the present 
case was one of the simplest in the choice-of-Iaw area. It was clear that 
New York had the only real interest in whether recovery should be 
granted, and that Michigan, on the other hand, had no interest in 
whether a New York plaintiff recovered against a New York defendant 
where the car was insured in New York. The fact that the deceased 
Ii 12 N.Y.2d 4711, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.8.2d 7411, 750 (19611). 
616 N.Y.2d 120.209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 4611 (1965). 
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guest and driver were in Michigan for an extended period of time was 
plainly irrelevant. 
Not content, however, to distinguish the two cases on their facts, the 
court of appeals then proceeded to overrule Dym. The primary point 
of the division of the court in Dym had been the construction placed 
on the Colorado "guest statute" by the majority opinion; this construc-
tion, the court concluded, was mistaken. The teleological argument 
advanced by some,7 that the guest statute is intended to assure the 
priority of injured non-guests in the assets of a negligent host, over-
looked not only the statutory history but also the fact that the statute 
permits recovery by guests who can establish that the accident was due 
to the gross negligence of the driver. If the purpose of the statute is to 
protect the rights of the injured "non-guest," there can be no rational 
basis for predicating that protection on the degree of negligence which 
the guest is able to establish. The only justification for the gross 
negligence statute is that the legitimate purpose of the statute - pre-
vention of fraudulent claims against local insurers - is furthered by 
increasing the guest's burden of proof. This purpose can never be 
vindicated by the application of the Michigan guest statute when, as in 
Tooker, the insurer is a New York carrier and the defendent is sued 
in the courts of New York. Under such circumstances, the court con-
cluded, the jurisdiction enacting such a "guest statute" can have 
absoluteJy no interest in the application of its law. 
The faulty analysis of the majority in Dym resulted in a decision 
which confused and clouded the choice-of-Iaw process in New York, 
particularly in guest-host suits. Tooker, by coming to grips with the 
mistaken approach in Dym, has given the "significant contacts" rule of 
Babcock a new and welcome clarity. 
Two months after Tooker was decided by the court of appeals, the 
New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, relied upon this clarification 
of New York conflicts law. In MacKendrick v. Newport News Ship-
building'" Dry Dock Co.,s a wrongful death action arising out of an 
industrial accident in Virginia, the New York court held that the law 
of New York and not of Virginia governed the rights of the victim's 
survivors, because New York was the jurisdiction of the most "sig-
nificant relationship" with the issue of damages. The court cited 
Tooker in support of this ruling.9 
7 See D. Cavers, Choice-of·Law Process 298 (1965). 
S 59 Misc. 2d 994, 302 N.Y.8.2d 124 (1969). 
9Id. at 1001, 302 N.Y.8.2d at 131-132. 
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